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INTRODUCTION
Fulfilling President Clinton's campaign promise to "end welfare as
we know it,"' the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Recon-
ciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) 2 substantially changed the delivery of
welfare in this country. PRWORA replaced Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children (AFDC) with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF). 3 Most importantly for the purposes of this article, PRWORA
imposed work requirements by mandating state participation rates and by
requiring work activity as a condition of welfare receipt after two years.
t Professor of Law and Social Responsibility. Chair, Department of Marketing Law and
Social Responsibility, Loyola College in Maryland.
I In a campaign pledge on October 23, 1991, Bill Clinton promised: "'In a Clinton
Administration, we're going to put an end to welfare as we know it.... We'll give them all
the help they need for up to two years. But after that, if they're able to work, they'll have to
take a job in the private sector, or start earning their way through community service." JOEL
HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 110 (1995).
2 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)
(1996) [hereinafter PRWORA].
3 Craig L. Briskin & Kimberly A. Thomas, The Waging of Welfare: All Work and No
Pay?, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 559, 562-63 (1998).
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Although touted as dramatic reform, work requirements are not a new
phenomenon.4 In modern times, the Work Incentive Program (WIN) in
1967, modified in WIN II, and in the Job Opportunity and Basic Skills
program (JOBS) of the Family Support Act of 1988 imposed work re-
quirements on welfare recipients. In contrast to prior work requirements,
however, PRWORA failed to specify whether welfare recipients fulfil-
ling their work requirements were entitled to employment protections,
such as minimum wage protections under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA).
5
Under PRWORA's policy of devolution to the states, states were
given discretion in how they would meet the statutory work require-
ments.6  Not surprisingly, most states have adopted a variety of ap-
proaches designed to ensure that welfare recipients meet the work
requirements. One approach has been to institute programs that require
work, typically in a public sector environment, in exchange for the wel-
fare benefit. Such programs, often termed workfare, present a plethora
of legal and moral questions.7 This article will address only the extent to
which workfare participants are entitled to the protections that the FLSA
offers, particularly minimum wage protections. 8 When one compares the
number of hours of work mandated by PRWORA to the dollar amount of
4 Work requirements have been offered as a response to poverty since the 1472 Statute
of Laborers. HANDLER, supra note 1, at 10.
5 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2003) [hereinafter FLSA].
The Family Support Act of 1988 clearly specified that any participant in a work program under
the statute was afforded the full benefits of federal employment legislation. Family Support
Act of 1988, Pub L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1998) [hereinafter FSA]. The legislative
history of PRWORA reveals that Republicans proposed inserting language in the statute that
would have explicitly denied FLSA coverage to workfare participants. Noelle M. Reese,
Workfare Participants Deserve Employment Protections under the Fair Labor Standards Act
and Workers' Compensation Laws, 31 RuTGERS L.J. 873, 880 (2000). That language was
removed when President Clinton threatened a veto. Briskin & Thomas, supra note 3, at 568.
Proposed language by the Democrats that would have explicitly afforded FLSA coverage,
however, failed to gamer enough support and the issue was never clarified. Id. at 568-69.
6 Each state was required to submit its own plan to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services detailing how the state would meet the goals of the statute.
7 One interesting issue is the extent to which such mandated employment constitutes
servitude. See Julie A. Nice, Welfare Servitude, I GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 340 (1994).
See also Anthony Bertelli, Impoverished Liberalism: Does the New York Workfare Program
Violate Human Rights? 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 175, 175 (1999) (concluding that New
York's Work Experience Program "unjustly limits human rights to freedom and well-being
and is morally invalid").
8 By failing to specify the extent to which workfare recipients are afforded protection
under employment laws, PRWORA also left unanswered the extent to which such participants
are afforded the protection of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), and worker's compensation statutes. See generally Nancy E. Hoffman,
Workfare Implications for the Public Sector, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 769 (1999) (discussing the
applicability of NLRA, Occupational Safety and Health Act, and various workers' compensa-
tion and anti-discrimination statutes to PRWORA); Terence O'Neil, Workfarefrom a Manage-
ment Perspective, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 813 (1999) (looking at whether Title VII, the
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the benefit, it has been estimated that many states are paying welfare
recipients more than fifty percent below minimum wage. 9 Moreover, as
Congress considers reauthorization of TANF, it is likely that the work
requirements will increase. If the work requirements are increased it be-
comes increasingly likely that more states and municipalities will turn to
workfare-like programs to meet the stricter requirements.' 0 Moreover, if
we are to require that greater numbers of welfare recipients work in ex-
change for their welfare checks, it is essential that we delineate the extent
to which they are to be afforded the protections afforded to all workers,
including minimum wage protections.
Whether or not states apply the minimum wage protections of the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)" 1 to welfare to work recipients de-
pends on whether or not such workers are considered covered "employ-
ees" under the FLSA. Only three states (Colorado, Minnesota, and Ohio)
have statutorily provided workfare recipients with legal employee sta-
tus. 12 The Department of Labor's (DOL) position is that the FLSA ap-
plies to workfare participants. 13 However, the DOL interpretation is not
determinative. Resolution of the issue has been left largely to the courts.
In Johns v. Stewart, 14 the only federal case to have considered the ques-
tion thus far, the court held that Utah's workfare participants were not
covered employees and therefore not entitled to minimum wage.
Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Age Discrimination and Employment Act applies to
workfare participants).
9 Walter M. Luers, Workfare Wages Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 203, 224 (1998). It has been estimated that, given the size of the average family
welfare benefit, the payment might work out to be as low as $2.40 per hour for full-time work.
John P. Collins, Jr., Development in Policy: Welfare Reform, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 221,
253 (1997). Non-cash benefits may, however, also count in the calculation. See id. at 256.
On the other hand, Professor Luers argues that such non-cash benefits typically furnished in-
kind should not count toward the minimum wage calculation. See Luers, supra, at 224-34.
10 SHAWN FREMSTAD & SHARON PARROTT, CENTER BUDGET POL'Y PRIORITIES, THE SEN-
ATE FINANCE COMMITTEE'S "TRI-PARTISAN" TANF REAUTHORIZATION BILL, 6-7 (2002).
11 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219; 52 Stat. 1060 (1938).
12 Vadim Mahmoudov, Note, Are Workfare Participants "Employees"?: Legal Issues
Presented by a Two-Tiered Labor Force, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 349, 357 (1998) (noting
that Ohio designates participants the full employee statutes under the Patterson v. Industrial
Comm'n, 672 N.E.2d 1008 (Ohio 1996) decision). Other states have statutorily guaranteed
minimum wage or workers' compensation protection to welfare to work recipients; for exam-
ple, see Florida, Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, New York and Wisconsin. Reese, supra note 5,
at 876 n.13.
13 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, How WORKPLACE LAWS APPLY TO WELFARE RECIPIENTS
(1997), at http://gatekeeper.dol.gov/dol/asp/public/w2w/welfare.htm ("Federal employment
laws, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act ... apply to welfare recipients as they apply to
other workers.").
14 57 F.3d 1544 (10th Cir. 1995).
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The Johns case has not, however, decided the issue. Commentators
criticize the case as unsound on both legal and public policy grounds.
15
It has been argued that the Johns court ignored the economic realities test
set forth by the Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coopera-
tive, Inc. 16 and failed correctly to apply the totality of the circumstances
approach from Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor. 17
In addition, the holding has been criticized as inconsistent with prior case
law which found that prison workers could constitute employees entitled
to FLSA protection,' 8 that homeless individuals who worked in a work
program were covered employees, 19 and that former mental patients per-
forming work at a hotel were employees.
20
This article will consider the extent to which workfare participants
should be considered employees under FLSA entitled to the protections
of the Act, such as minimum wage. In order to accomplish that goal,
Part I provides an overview of PRWORA work requirements and de-
scribes the ways in which states have been moving to meet the require-
ments, including workfare. Part II discusses the relevant FLSA
provisions, including the applicable definitions and the statute's policy
goals. In addition, this Part examines the various tests used by the courts
to determine whether a worker meets the statutory definition of an em-
ployee entitled to FLSA protection. Part III applies these tests to the
typical workfare placement and concludes that workfare participants
should be afforded the protections of federal employment law, including
minimum wage protections, from both a statutory and a public policy
perspective. Part IV examines the public policy objectives of the FLSA,
as well as of PRWORA, and concludes that extending FLSA coverage to
include workfare participants can best achieve these objectives. This
section also briefly examines the most recent Senate and House bills
(under consideration as part of TANF reauthorization). 2 Both bills
15 See Briskin & Thomas, supra note 3, at 570-73; Mahmoudov, supra note 12, at
365-68; Kevin J. Miller, Comment, Welfare and the Minimum Wage: Are Workfare Partici-
pants "Employees" Under the Fair Labor Standards Act?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 204-06
(1999); Reese, supra note 5, at 892-94.
16 366 U.S. 28 (1961).
17 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
18 See Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549 (5th Cir. 1990).
19 Archie v. Grand Cent. P'ship, 997 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
20 Donovan v. New Floridian Hotel, 676 F.2d 468 (Fla. 1982).
21 This article will consider House Bill 4737 and the Senate Tri-Partisan Consensus pro-
visions. Both bills were proposed during the Summer of 2002. Legislation reauthorizing
TANF was not passed and the timetable was extended to March 31, 2003. National Immigra-
tion Center, Congress Adjourns without Reauthorizing TANF, 16 IMMIGR. RTS. UPDATE 7
(2002), at http://www.nilc.org/immspbsTANFTANFOO5.htm. The provisions outlined in any
new proposals are not expected to differ dramatically from the prior House and Senate bills.
Robert Greenstein asserts that President Bush's most recent proposal appears to "recycle the
requirements proposed last year." Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Statement of Robert
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would increase the work participation requirements. 22 To the extent that
such increased work participation requirements are expected to lead to
increased workfare programs 23 and to require more hours to be worked
to earn the TANF benefit, the problem this article outlines will be exac-
erbated. This article concludes by challenging Congress to address this
issue in the reauthorization bills.
I. PRWORA OVERVIEW
In the early 1990's, public policy attention focused on perceived
problems surrounding the delivery of welfare in this country. Large
numbers of people lived below the poverty line,24 a high percentage of
whom were children. 25 An increasing number of people received AFDC
or welfare. 26 In addition, government expenditures on welfare had
grown steadily since its inception in 1935.27 Thus, proponents of welfare
Greenstein, Executive Director, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities on President Bush 's
Announcement Regarding TANF Reauthorization (Jan. 14, 2003), at http://www.centeronbud
get.org/1-14-03tanf.htm. Moreover, there is some indication that any new proposals might
receive expedited Congressional review. Amy Goldstein, Bush Presses Lawmakers to Back
Welfare Changes: President Favors Stricter Rules; House and Senate Set March 31 Deadline
to Pass Legislation, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2003, at A04 ("A spokeswoman for the Ways and
Means Committee said House leaders probably would bring a welfare bill directly to the
House floor in time to meet the new March deadline, bypassing the traditional consideration
by committees because the measure was debated in detail by several House panels last year.").
22 Both bills propose to increase the work participation requirements to 70% in 2007.
Furthermore, the House bill would increase the number of hours required from 30 to 40. See
infra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
23 FREMSTAD & PARROTT, supra note 10.
24 "In 1995, the official poverty line for a family of four was $15,150, [which is] more
than 38 million people [or] about 14.5 percent of the population" that fell below the poverty
line. JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, WE THE POOR PEOPLE: WORK, POVERTY,
AND WELFARE 53 (1997). Poverty rates declined from approximately 22% in 1960 to about
11% in 1973, and reached a high of 15% in 1984 before declining slightly. WILLIAM M.
EPSTEIN, WELFARE IN AMERICA: How SOCIAL SCIENCE FAILS THE POOR 15 (1997).
25 By 1992, 80% of persons in poor families were women and children. Kathleen M.
Harris, Life After Welfare: Women, Work, and Repeat Dependency, 61 AM. Soc. REV. 407,
407 (1996). In 1995, 15.2 million children were reportedly poor, or 20% of all children in the
United States. HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 24, at 53. In 1996, one out of seven
children in the United States was on welfare. Gertrude Himmelfarb, Welfare as a Moral Prob-
lem, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 685, 687 (1996). Thus, one could argue that welfare was not
"working." Although the United States has been administering AFDC since 1935 (previously
under the title of Aid to Dependent Children), large numbers of people still live in poverty,
especially children. MIMi ABRAMOVITZ, UNDER ATTACK, FIGHTING BACK: WOMEN AND WEL-
FARE IN THE UNITED STATES 63 (2000).
26 AFDC rolls grew from about 7.5 million recipients in 1970 to about 14.1 million in
1993. EPSTEIN, supra note 24, at 24. Approximately 9.5 million children received AFDC in
1993. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS 165 (1996). On the other hand,
while absolute numbers of people on AFDC had grown, concerns about this growth ignore the
fact that between I I and 13% of all children have received AFDC consistently. ABRAMOVITZ.
supra note 25, at 24.
27 In 1993, the total amount spent by both federal and state governments on AFDC had
risen to $22.3 billion. HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 24, at 8. "The federal share of
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reform argued that despite the growing amounts of money spent on wel-
fare, the number of people living in poverty and on welfare was in fact
increasing. More troubling to the general public was its perception of a
welfare dependent populace and the attendant behavior problems that
were thought to accompany welfare receipt.28 The rise of illegitimate
births and the fact that one-half of families headed by women received
welfare fueled the move to reform. Welfare was in "crisis" and the solu-
tion seemed to be welfare reform.
Welfare reform was achieved by way of PRWORA, enacted in
1996. PRWORA was designed to provide assistance to needy families,
so that children could be cared for in their own home; end the depen-
dence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job prepa-
ration, work and marriage; prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-
wedlock pregnancies; and encourage the formation and maintenance of
two-parent families. 29 One of the central features of PRWORA was
time-limited welfare and work requirements. 30 Work requirements were
imposed by the statute in two ways. First, PRWORA mandated state
participation rates. In other words, in order to receive the full block
grant, states were required to compel 25% of the families receiving assis-
tance to engage in a "work activity" by the end of the 1997 fiscal year.
3t
The percentage rose to 50% in the year 2002.32 Work activities included
such activities as unsubsidized employment, subsidized private and pub-
lic sector employment, on-the-job training, job searches within specified
limits, community service programs, vocational training, and attendance
at secondary school. 33 Second, one could not receive aid for longer than
AFDC costs was $12.2 billion, or 1.5% of all federal spending." Id. "In 1995, $177 billion
was spent on federal means-tested entitlement programs, with approximately $82 billion spend
on Medicaid." Epstein, supra note 24, at 22. The public perceives that budgetary cost have
increased, despite the fact that real spending on AFDC fell between 1970 and 1983. THEO-
DORE R. MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE: PERSISTENT MYTHS,
ENDURING REALITIES 84-86 (1990); see also Nice, supra note 7, at 341.
28 See EPSTEIN, supra note 24, at 15-22 (discussing the rise of social problems and their
link to economic disparity).
29 PRWORA § 601(a)(l).
30 PRWORA §§ 602, 607; see generally HANDLER, supra note 1, at 1-9 (arguing that
there are three pillars of welfare reform: devolution of authority to the states, time limits and
work requirements, and social behavioral provisions).
31 PRWORA § 407(a)(1).
32 PRWORA § 607(a)(1). These relatively high participation requirements are, however,
offset by caseload reduction credits. The result therefore is considerably lower participation
rates. See FRAMSTAD & PARROTT, supra note 10; see also infra notes 139-40 and accompany-
ing text.
33 42 U.S.C. § 607(d) provides that a welfare recipient can satisfy the work requirement
by performing any one of the following work activities: "(1) unsubsidized employment; (2)
subsidized private sector employment; (3) subsidized public sector employment; (4) work ex-
perience... (5) on-the-job training; (6) job search and job readiness assistance; (7) commu-
nity service programs; (8) vocational educational training ... ; (9) job skills training directly
related to employment; (10) education directly related to employment, in the case of a recipi-
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two years unless engaged in a statutorily mandated work activity. Fur-
thermore, PRWORA set an absolute time limit of five years upon the
receipt of welfare.
34
PRWORA did exempt certain persons from the work requirement.
For example, the state could choose to exempt single custodial parents of
children under the age of 12 months from the work requirement. 35 Simi-
larly, single parents of children under the age of 6 years could meet the
work requirements by working 20 hours a week. 36 In addition, teen
heads of households met the work participation requirement by maintain-
ing satisfactory attendance in secondary school. 37 Penalties were pro-
vided for failure to engage in work activities. 38 If an individual refused
to engage in work activities, the state could either reduce the amount of
assistance or terminate the assistance altogether.39
Although work requirements were the bedrock of the 1996 welfare
reform, they were not an entirely novel idea.40 In modem times, work
requirements had been imposed in the Work Incentive Program (WIN) in
1967, were modified in WIN II, and expanded significantly in the JOBS
program of the Family Support Act.41 The work requirements under
PRWORA differed, however, from previous requirements both in prac-
tice and in theory. First, the PRWORA work requirements were
mandatory, and the Act imposed penalties for failure to meet the require-
ments. While requirements under JOBS, for example, were supposed to
be mandatory, sanctions were rarely imposed; participation was, by and
large, voluntary. 42 Second, the theoretical approach had changed. Work
ent who has not received a high school diploma or a certificate of high school equivalency;
(11) satisfactory attendance at a secondary school or in a course or study leading to a certifi-
cate of general equivalence ... and (12) the provision of child care services to an individual
who is participating in a community service program."
34 PRWORA § 602(a)(1)(A)(ii).
35 PRWORA § 608(a)(7).
36 PRWORA § 607(b)(5).
37 PRWORA § 607(c)(2)(B).
38 PRWORA § 607(c)(2)(C).
39 PRWORA § 607(e).
40 Some have argued that the provisions of PRWORA, including the work requirements,
are merely incremental reform. See, e.g., Nan S. Ellis, The Cycle of Welfare Reform: An
Examination of Incremental Reform (1997) (unpublished working paper presented at the An-
nual Conference of the Academy of Legal Studies in Business).
41 WIN was initiated in 1967 under the Title IV, Parts A & C of Social Security Act of
1967, 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1967). PRWORA § 602(a)(19) (1988). WIN II was enacted under 42
U.S.C. § 633 (1994). See, e.g., Anne Simmons, A Ride to Work: TEA-21 and PRWORA, 18
LAW & INEQ. 243, 247-48 (2000) (describing the work requirement aspect of WIN, WIN II,
and JOBS).
42 See generally Miller, supra note 15, at 185-87 (discussing the general provisions and
philosophy of TANF). See also Kathryn R. Lang, Fair Work, not "Workfare": Examining the
Role of Subsidized Jobs in Fulfilling States' Work Requirements under the Personal Responsi-
bility and Work Reconciliation Act of 1996, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 959 (1998). The author
describes the work program under WIN as "largely symbolic, since states enrolled only a small
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requirements under WIN and JOBS, for example, were based on a
human capital investment theory.4 3 In other words, it was assumed that
welfare recipients were poor because they lacked the skills necessary to
find and keep a job.44 Therefore, the purpose of the work requirements
was to train welfare recipients so that they could obtain the skills neces-
sary to find and keep a job. On the other hand, the theoretical basis of
PRWORA was a labor force attachment model. 45 This approach, termed
a work-first approach, assumed that welfare recipients lacked the neces-
sary work ethic or work experience to enable them to get and keep a
job. 4 6 As the theoretical basis for work requirements changed, the nature
of those requirements changed. In a tactic designed to foster a quick
attachment to the workforce, most states moved from education and
training programs to work activities, such as subsidized jobs.
4 7
percentage of welfare recipients in work programs, and generally did not sanction those who
refused to participate." Id. at 964. In contrast, though Lang describes the work requirements
under the Family Support Act as "mandatory" for AFDC recipients, she states that "[o]ver
fifty-six percent of adult AFDC recipients were exempted from JOBS programs." Id. at
966-68.
43 Under a human capital theory, workers are viewed as "embodying a set of skills that
can be 'rented out' to employers. The knowledge and skills a worker has-which come from
education and training, including the learning that experience yields-generate a certain stock
of productive capital .... [T]he value of this amount of productive capital is derived from how
much these skills can earn in the labor market." RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH,
MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 290 (7th ed. 2000).
44 See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Working without a Job: The Social Messages of the New
Workfare, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 19, 21 (1998) ("This view assumes that job openings
exist, but that employers are unlikely to hire welfare recipients unless they receive additional
training."); Lang, supra note 42, at 967 (asserting that the JOBS program "shifted the empha-
sis ... to a range of education, training and job-readiness programs for recipients.").
45 Under the labor force attachment model, getting welfare recipients into the workplace
is of paramount importance. This model is designed to allow recipients develop the work
experience necessary to move into better paying jobs. Most importantly, experience is a way
for recipients to develop the necessary work ethic. See Briskin & Thomas, supra note 3, at
563 ("PRA forwards a 'work first' philosophy .... "). See also Lang, supra note 42, at
972-73 (outlining the "'work ethic' deficiency"). Further, work has intrinsic value, as "it can
help welfare recipients develop a sense of self-respect, self-confidence, and identity in our
work-oriented society." Robert D. Reischauer, The Welfare Reforn Legislation: Directions
for the Future, in WELFARE POLICY FOR THE 1990s 10, 26 (Phoebe H. Cottingham & David T.
Ellwood eds., 1989).
Additionally, work is part of reciprocal arrangement, under which the welfare recipient
works as part of her responsibilities under a social contract to receive government benefits.
See generally Lawrence Mead, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATION OF CITIZEN-
SHIP (1986).
46 See Diller, supra note 44, at 25 ("The PRWORA's approach assumes that there are
jobs available to public assistance recipients, but that recipients choose welfare as a desirable
alternative. Under this view, work requirements serve the purpose of making receipt of benefit
unpleasant, thereby pushing reluctant recipients into the worktorce.").
47 Lang, supra note 42, at 977 ("[Mlany states have shifted away from the JOBS strategy
of education and training, and now are focusing on work activities, such as subsidized jobs and
work experience programs, for those who are unable to find unsubsidized employment.").
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The PRWORA left it to each state to determine how they would
meet the work requirement.4 8 Therefore, there was a great deal of varia-
tion from state to state. Most states tried to funnel welfare recipients into
non-subsidized private sector employment whenever possible. There-
fore, many states offered job search services, often coupled with more
intensive job placement or job readiness programs. States often provided
subsidized employment in the private sector.49 Importantly for the pur-
poses of this article, some states and municipalities 50 created public sec-
tor employment programs, often termed workfare programs. Although
these programs vary dramatically from state to state, they typically pro-
vide low-skill employment, with little training, and little chance of a full-
time job.5' Because such programs typically require welfare recipients
to work in exchange for their welfare benefits, the question naturally
arises as to whether such recipients are employees entitled to FLSA pro-
tection. To consider that question, Part II will first provide an overview
of the FLSA, including a discussion of relevant definitions. Part II will
also include a discussion of prior case law setting forth the tests used to
determine employee status under the FLSA.
48 See Kay P. Kindred, Of Child Welfare and Welfare Reform: The Implications for Chil-
dren when Contradictory Policies Collide, 9 Wm. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 413, 413 (2003)
("Among the many changes effected ... [was] increased authority of the states over cash-
assistance programs for needy families, giving states flexibility in designing programs within
the block grant scheme and significantly reducing federal oversight ... ").
49 Monies are also made available pursuant to the Welfare-to-Work grants program, the
Work Opportunity Tax Credit and the Welfare to Work Tax Credit to provide an incentive to
private sector employers to hire welfare to work recipients. Tax Payer Relief Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-34, §603, 111 Stat. 862. Tax credits are available for individuals that receive
assistance from designated State programs relating to "needy families with minor children."
I.R.C. § 51(d)(2) (Supp. 111 1995-1998).
50 New York City, for example, runs one of the largest workfare programs in the nation.
In its Work Experience Program (WEP), welfare recipients are required to work between 20
and 26 hours. Typical placements include work programs with the Departments of Parks and
Recreation, Sanitation and Transportation. Mahmoudov, supra note 12, at 352. See also
Bertelli, supra note 7, at 181 (describing the WEP program as including entry-level office
jobs, jobs maintaining public property, janitorial and sanitation services); Patricia A. Quigley,
Note, Protection of Existing Workers and the Implementation of "Workfare," 14 HOFSTRA
LAB. L.J. 625, 636-37 (describing the work performed by workfare participants for the De-
partment of Transportation and for the Department of Sanitation as clerical duties, office main-
tenance, or street-cleaning).
51 See generally Mahmoudov, supra note 12, at 352-355 (using the New York City WEP
program as an example of a typical workfare program, including dangerous and unsanitary
working conditions and a large numbers of participants that funnel through and have a dismal
likelihood of finding employment after leaving the program). See infra note 108 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the effectiveness of workfare programs at moving people into
the workforce.
2003]
10 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
II. FLSA COVERAGE
A. STATUTORY OVERVIEW
Congress passed the FLSA in 1938 with a number of stated goals.
52
First, the legislature designed it protect low-end wage earners and to as-
sure that their labor could earn them monies sufficient to maintain an
adequate standard of living.53 Second, and of equal importance, the
FLSA was meant to ensure that competition was protected-both in gen-
eral, and specifically in the market for low-waged labor.54 To accom-
plish these goals, the FLSA required, among other provisions, that all
employees be paid a minimum wage.
55
52 Congress described the purpose of the Act as follows: "[T]he existence ..., in indus-
tries engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, of labor conditions
detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, effi-
ciency, and general well-being of workers (1) causes commerce and the channels and instru-
mentalities of commerce to be used to spread and perpetuate such labor conditions among the
workers of the several States; (2) burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce;
(3) constitutes an unfair method of competition in commerce; (4) leads to labor disputes bur-
dening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; and (5) interferes
with the orderly and fair marketing of goods in commerce." FLSA § 202(a).
53 See Luers, supra note 9, at 209-10 ("Congress established a balance of power between
the employer and the employee by protecting certain groups of the population ... from 'sub-
standard wages' and 'excessive hours' that were dangerous to the national health and well-
being."); Reese, supra note 5, at 885 ("The FLSA's minimum wage and overtime provisions
aim to protect low-end wage earners in particular from substandard wages and excessive hours
... The FLSA aimed to maintain the public's health by providing a minimum standard of
living to American workers."). Legislative history makes it clear that "the prime purpose of
the legislation was to aid the unprotected, unorganized and the lowest paid of the nation's
working population; that is, those employees who lacked sufficient bargaining power to secure
for themselves a minimum subsistence wage." Miller, supra note 15, at 193 (quoting Brooklyn
Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 n.18 (1945)).
54 See Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern American
Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983,
1003 (1999) ("This congressional program was designed to benefit not only workers but also
reputable employers, who, prior to the FLSA, had operated at a competitive disadvantage vis-
a-vis their sweatshop competitors ...."). Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, describes an
excellent example of an employer who was permitted, unfairly, to pay less than the minimum
wage, a substandard wage benefit. In Watson, the local sheriff administered a work release
program. Id. at 1551. Pursuant to that program, the sheriff assigned plaintiffs to a construc-
tion business owned by his daughter and son-in-law for $20 a day. Id. The construction
business employed only two employees (the daughter and son-in-law), and prisoners or sub-
contractors did all the other work. Id. The court held that the effect on commerce is obvi-
ous-the daughter and son-in-law were able to offer cheaper services than their competitors.
Id. at 1555 ("Obviously, construction contractors in the area could not compete ... because
they had to pay at least minimum wage for even unskilled labor ... It takes little imagination
to recognize that job opportunities for non-inmate workers in the area was severely distorted
by the availability of twenty dollar per day workers from the parish jail."). The court found
the situation "fraught with the very problems that FLSA was drafted to prevent-grossly un-
fair competition among employers and employees alike." Id.
55 The FLSA provides that "[e]very employer shall pay to each of his employees ...
engaged in commerce" the statutory minimum wage." FLSA §206(a).
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Congress intended FLSA coverage to be broad. 56 The protections
of the FLSA apply to all "covered employees." Therefore, whether or
not any workers, including workfare participants, are entitled to FLSA
protections like minimum wage guarantees depends on their ability to be
classified as employees under the statute. In other words, only if one
falls within the statutory definition of an employee is she 57 covered by
the FLSA. Unfortunately, the statutory definitions are decidedly un-
helpful. The FLSA defines an "employee" as "any individual employed
by an employer." 58 An "employer" is defined as "any person acting di-
rectly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an em-
ployee and includes a public agency." 59 Last, the Act defines the term
"employ" as "to suffer or permit to work."'60 Commentators have noted
the circuitous nature of this definitional scheme more than once.6' Given
the ambiguous and circular language of the statutory definitions, the
courts have been left to interpret FLSA coverage and the parameters of
what constitutes an "employee. '62
Although the statutory definitions are unhelpful, legislative history
and subsequent case law provide some guidance. It is clear, for example,
that the legislature intended that the term employee be given a broad
interpretation in favor of finding employee status.63 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court defines the term employee more broadly than the defini-
tion resulting from traditional common law agency tests.64
56 Luers, supra note 9, at 210. "Today, the FLSA covers over 70 million people, or
85.6% of the American workforce." See also Goldstein et al., supra note 54, at 1004 (discuss-
ing the fact that broad coverage is essential to achieve the policy goals of the statute).
57 Because most welfare recipients are female and because the focus of this article is on
the work protections afforded to working welfare recipients, the term "she" will be used
throughout this article, instead of the more generic "he/she."
58 FLSA §203(e).
59 FLSA §203(d).
60 FLSA §203(g). See generally Goldstein et al., supra note 54, at 1003-15 (discussing
the definition of "employ" and concluding that courts interpret that definition more narrowly
than Congress intended).
61 See generally Marshall v. Baptist Hospital, Inc., 473 F.Supp. 465, 467 (Tenn, 1979)
("The definition of "employee" provided in the Act is virtually circular."); Richard R. Carlson,
Why the Law Still Can't Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How it Ought to Stop Trying,
22 BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 295, 296 (2001) ("An 'employer,' the Act continues, is a
person 'acting ... in the interest of an employer in the interest of an employee,' thus bringing
the matter around full circle." (emphasis in original)).
62 Mahmoudov, supra note 12, at 358 ("Given such vague and circular language, the
issue of employee status under the FLSA has been left to the courts to determine.").
63 See Reese, supra note 5, at 885. Senator Hugo Black, the principal sponsor of the
FLSA, described the term "employee" as the "broadest definition that has ever been included
in any one act." United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 n.3 (1945) (citing 81 Cong.
Rec. 7656-57 (daily ed. Jul. 27, 1937) (statement of Sen. Black)).
64 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992); see also Mahmoudov,
supra note 12, at 358-59; Goldstein et al., supra note 54, at 1004 ("The 'striking breadth' of
the FLSA definition of 'employ' covers work relationships that were not within the 'employer-
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Courts are constantly confronted with the question of FLSA cover-
age and have thus been forced to define an employee. Courts have also
made clear that when determining employee status they are not bound by
the labels used by the participants, 65 but instead will examine the eco-
nomic realities of the relationship. 66 They have rejected a technical con-
cept approach and instead use a case-by-case determination of employee
status. Therefore, any court's attempt to determine whether an individual
worker is an employee within the meaning of the FLSA requires an ex-
amination of the economic realities of the situation.
B. THE ECONOMIC REALITIES TEST
Under the economic realities test, courts consider the economic real-
ities of the situation and inquire whether the worker should best be
viewed as an employee entitled to FLSA protection. In attempting to
determine the economic realities of a situation, some courts have used a
four-factor test, the so-called Bonnette test, 67 which investigates whether
the alleged employer has:
1) the power to hire and fire employees;
2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules
or conditions of employment;
3) determined the rate and method of payment; and
4) maintained employment records.
68
Courts that have used the Bonnette test have found employee status
when not all factors of the test have been met by applying the test rather
loosely. 69 Others have noted that this test seems more suited to deter-
mining employer status, 70 or have rejected the Bonnette test entirely, sub-
stituting a more general review of the economic realities of the
employee category' at common law."). Common law uses the master-servant distinction to
determine if a worker is an employee or an independent contractor. See Restatement (Second)
of Agency § 220 (1958) (defining "servant" within master-servant context).
65 See Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1554 (5th Cir. 1990). ("We must also look to
the substantive realities of the relationship, not to mere forms or labels ascribed to the laborer
by those who would avoid coverage."); Marshall, 473 F.Supp. at 467 ("Our decisions have
made one thing clear about the Fair Labor Standards Act: its applicability is not fixed by labels
that parties may attach to their relationship nor by common law categories nor by classifica-
tions under other statutes."); see also Judith E. Bendich, When Is a Temp not a Temp?, TRIAL,
Oct. 2001, at 42-48 (discussing employer schemes for misclassifying workers and arguing that
the FLSA is an effective tool for remedying abuses).
66 See Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., 366 U.S. 28, 31-33 (1961).
67 See, e.g, Mahmoudov, supra note 12, at 358; Miller, supra note 15, at 195 ("Bonnette
is now widely accepted as the proper approach to the Supreme Court's 'economic realities'
test.").
68 Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983).
69 See, e.g., Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549 (5th Cir. 1990).
70 See, e.g., Mahmoudov, supra note 12, at 359.
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situation. 71 Such courts have employed an alternative test, instead focus-
ing on the totality of the circumstances. 72 These courts look at the nature
of the relationship between the parties, the nature of the work, and the
policy goals of the FLSA. This obviously necessitates a case by case
examination of the facts.
C. TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST
The totality of the circumstances test has been employed in a variety
of circumstances. Under this analysis, courts have found that prisoners
were employees, 73 as were former mental patients working at a hotel,
74
while neither jurors75 nor student resident assistants were employees. 76
In using the totality of the circumstances test, courts typically look
at the type of work being performed and at the nature of the relationship
between the alleged employer and alleged employee. 77  Furthermore,
courts consider three additional factors to be relevant. Among the factors
that are considered of paramount importance is whether the labor per-
formed by the worker benefited the employer or the worker. 78 More spe-
71 See Danneskjold v. Hausrath, 82 F.3d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[W]e ... reject [the
lower court's] use of the four-part Bonnette test to make that determination."); Henthorn v.
Department of Navy, 29 F.3d 682, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding that the Bonnette test does not
make sense when a "prisoner is legally compelled to part with his labor as part of a penologi-
cal work assignment and is paid by the prisoner authorities themselves .. "); Vanskike v.
Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 1992); Watson, 909 F.2d at 1554 (examining beyond the
four prong test in Bonnette to consider the economic realities of the situation as well as the
FLSA policy objectives); see also Goldstein et al., supra note 54, at 1010 (questioning the
economic realities test, as the "analysis is not tied to the statutory definition, it is not tied to the
congressional purpose in using such a broad definition, and it is not even tied to the concept of
,economic dependency' because it is not clear what that terms means").
72 See, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290
(1985); Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544 (10th Cir. 1995). See also Miller, supra note 15, at 198.
73 Watson, 909 F.2d at 1553-56.
74 Donovan v. New Floridian Hotel, 676 F.2d at 468, 473-76 (Fla. 1982).
75 Brouwer v. Metropolitan Dade County, 139 F.3d 817, 819 (11 th Cir. 1998) ("Jurors
are completely different from state ... employees. Jurors do not apply for employment, they
are randomly selected from voter registration lists .... Jurors do not voluntarily tender their
labor to the state, but are compelled to serve.").
76 Marshall v. Regis Educational Corp., 666 F.2d 1324, 1327 (Colo. 1981) (holding that
though non-students perform some of the services that the resident assistants perform, "these
are isolated aspects of a total program which must be considered within the full educational
context." The students did not become resident assistants "to take jobs. [Rather t]hey enrolled
as full-time students seeking growth and development ... ").
77 For example, the Henthorn court looked at the nature of the prison-prisoner relation-
ship when the prison assigned a prisoner to janitorial and maintenance chores for the Navy. 29
F.3d at 684-87. The court held that when an "inmate's labor is compelled and/or where any
compensation he receives is set and paid by his custodian, the prisoner" has no claim under the
FLSA. Id at 686.
78 See Donovan, 676 F.2d at 471 ("[T]hese five mental patients did work which was of
economic benefit to the appellants."). But see Marshall, 666 F.2d at 1327 ("The mere fact that
the College may have derived some economic value from the [resident assistant] program does
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cifically, in examining the extent to which the labor performed benefited
the employer or the worker, courts consider the primary beneficiary of
the labor.79 Courts apply these tests liberally. For example, in Marshall
v. Regis Educational Corp.,80 the court found that student resident-hall
assistant appointees were recipients of a form of student financial aid
despite the college's receipt of some benefits from their labor. A second
factor that some courts consider is whether or not the worker plaintiffs
displaced other workers.8 ' Lastly, courts look at the objectives the stat-
ute is meant to achieve and consider the extent to which the actions com-
plained of frustrate those purposes. That is, courts consider the extent to
which the facts of the case warrant a finding of FLSA coverage, and
employee status, to protect the worker involved, or to protect the workers
of competitors from unfair competition. 82 For example, in the prison
cases, most courts examine the extent to which the prisoners are being
used to make goods or offer services that compete in the marketplace.
83
To the extent that the alleged employer competes with others providing
similar goods or services, the use of sub-minimum wage labor affords
him an unfair advantage. Moreover, to the extent that other low-wage
workers are competing with prisoners for jobs, the availability of sub-
minimum wage labor depresses the cost of that labor.
D. EXEMPTIONS
Two statutory exemptions from employee coverage merit discussion
in FLSA coverage cases. The language of the statute expressly excludes
volunteers and trainees from FLSA coverage. Because one might argue
that workfare participants are either volunteers or trainees, it is important
to outline the circumstances under which both exemptions apply. First,
one who volunteers his services is not an employee within the meaning
of the Act.84 Courts have defined a volunteer as "[a]n individual who,
not override the education benefits of the program and is not dispositive of the 'employee'
issue.").
79 Here the courts draw the trainee literature by analogy. See infra notes 90-98 and the
accompanying text.
80 666 F.2d at 1327.
81 See id. (holding that the resident assistants "did not displace other employees whom
the College would otherwise have been required to hire.").
82 See Briskin & Thomas, supra note 3, at 569-70 ("Thus, a court considering FLSA
coverage must look at not only the attributes of the work, but also the ramifications of protect-
ing that work in order to sustain the welfare of workers as well as safe and fair commerce in
the market."). See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text where the policy objectives of
FLSA are discussed.
83 See Danneskjold, 82 F.3d at 42-44; Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 811 ("The use of cheap
prison labor to make such products ... poses a risk of unfair competition."); see also Watson
v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1555 (5th Cir. 1990).
84 Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 284-03; Rodriquez v. Township of Holiday
Lakes, 866 F.Supp 1012 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 1994).
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'without promise or expectation of compensation, but solely for his per-
sonal purpose or pleasure, worked in activities carried on by other per-
sons either for their pleasure or profit."' 85 Using this definition, courts
have found police officers to be employees, rather than volunteers, when
they were motivated to work for reasons other than charitable or humani-
tarian reasons; 86 they have also found rehabilitated drug addicts and
criminals working for a shelter to be employees when they work in ex-
change for food, clothing and shelter.
87
Second, although trainees are exempt from FLSA coverage, 88 the
Act provides little useful guidance to distinguish between trainees and
employees. Using the factors first set forth in Walling v. Portland Termi-
nal Co., 89 the Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division drafted a
list of six relevant criteria to determine whether a worker is properly
classified as an exempt trainee or as an employee. The DOL test
provides:
" Whether trainees are employees under the Act... will
depend upon all the circumstances surrounding their
activities on the premises of the employer. If all six of
the following criteria apply, the trainees are not em-
ployees within the meaning of the Act:
" The training, even though it includes actual operation
of the facilities of the employer, is similar to that
which would be given in a vocational school;
* The training is for the benefit of the trainee;
* The trainees do not displace regular employees but
work under close supervision;
* The employer that provides the training derives no im-
mediate advantage from the activities of the trainees
and on occasion his operations may actually be
impeded;
* The trainees are not necessarily entitled to a job at the
completion of the training period; and
85 Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 295 (quoting Walling v. Portland Terminal
Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947)).
86 Rodriquez, 866 F.Supp at 1017-21.
87 Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 290-91.
88 See generally Deborah F. Harris, When is Individual in Training an "Employee" for
Purposes of §3(e)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 USCS § 203(e)(1)), 50 A.L.R. Fed.
632 (1980); David L. Gregory, The Problematic Employment Dynamics of Student Internships,
12 NOTRE DAME L.J. ETHICS & PUB. PoL'Y, 227, 242-43 (1998) (arguing student interns
should not be included in the apprentice, learner or student learner exemptions).
89 330 U.S. 148 (1947).
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* The employer and the trainees understand that the
trainees are not entitled to wages for the time spent in
training.90
This list of factors is not exhaustive; a court may find a worker to be
a trainee non-employee even if all six factors are not met.9' Using this
test, courts found that workers undergoing a licensed pilot apprenticeship
program, 92 homeless and jobless participants in an employment pro-
gram,93 snack food distribution trainees, 94 and trainees in a hospital's
radiation department as part of a two year program were all employees,
95
while fire-fighter trainees were not employees.
96
It is apparent that under either the Bonnette test or under the more
general totality of the circumstances test, whether a worker is afforded
the protections of an employee under FLSA depends upon the individual
facts of the case. The next section will attempt to apply both of these
tests to the typical workfare situation.
III. ARE WORKFARE PARTICIPANTS EMPLOYEES?
A. APPLICATION OF TESTS
Given the above analysis, one can at least reasonably argue that
workfare participants are employees within the meaning of the statute.
To determine employee status and, therefore, FLSA coverage, courts ap-
ply either the four-part Bonnette test or a more general totality of the
circumstances analysis. First, let us apply the Bonnette test to the typical
workfare scenario. The Bonnette test asks us to first focus on the
whether the alleged employer has the power to hire and fire employees.
While this will, of course, vary from program to program, the govern-
ment agency or non-profit organization where the workfare participants
are placed typically has at least the defacto power to hire and fire. These
workfare programs are somewhat similar to the facts in the Watson
97
case. There, the sheriff could overrule decisions made by the contractor-
90 Wage & Hour Manual (BNA) 91:416 (1975).
91 See Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1023-24 (10th Cir. 1993); Archie
v. Grand Cent. Partnership, Inc., 997 F.Supp. 504, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
92 Bailey v. Pilots' Ass'n, 406 F.Supp. 1302, 1307 (Penn. Dist. Ct. 1976) ("Though it
appears that the parties in the instant action did not contemplate compensation for the appren-
ticeship period, the duties performed by the Plaintiff were of immediate benefit to the Defen-
dant Association. There was evidence that the apprentices substituted for hired men.
93 Archie, 997 F.Supp. at 531.
94 Reich, 992 F.2d at 1029 ("Except for one area-the expectation of employment upon
successful completion of the course-application of the six factor test indicates that the train-
ees were not employees.").
95 McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1989).
96 Marshall v. Baptist Hospital, Inc., 473 F.Supp. 465, 465 (Tenn. 1979).
97 Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1555 (5th Cir. 1990).
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employers and had actual authority to hire and fire. The Watson court
found that the sheriff's power was irrelevant, however, when compared
with the crucial de facto authority of the contractor-employer. Under this
reasoning, a court would consider the fact that the workfare placement
offices have some say in placement to be irrelevant in determining if the
supervisor at the government agency or non-profit organization is an em-
ployer. Thus, this prong of the test seems likely to be met in most
workfare situations. The second Bonnette prong, supervision and con-
trol, is likewise easily satisfied in most workfare situations. The agency
or organization where the participant is placed has the power to make
work schedules and to control the behavior of the participant on the job.
Whether the third Bonnette prong can be satisfied depends on the specif-
ics of the placement, but this prong is not likely to be met in the typical
workfare situation. If the state sets the benefit level and places the par-
ticipant with a participating agency, it is the state and not the agency that
sets the rate and method of payment. On the other hand, the agency may
be allowed to determine how much it will pay participants for particular
jobs, possibly meeting the requirements of the third prong. Similarly,
whether the fourth prong is satisfied depends entirely upon the facts of
the individual situation, but the agency is likely to maintain employment
records on each participant. Therefore, it seems that whether a workfare
participant will meet the definition of an employee under the Bonnette
test depends on the nature of the placement and the administrative over-
sight of the particular workfare program.
Such workers seem to more typically fit the FLSA definition of an
employee under the totality of the circumstances approach to the ques-
tion of workfare participants' status. In considering the totality of the
circumstances, courts would note that workfare participants often work
side-by-side with traditional employees.98 The only thing distinguishing
them from the traditional employees is the fact that the traditional em-
ployees are being paid at least minimum wage. The nature of the work
performed by workfare participants does not usually differ from that per-
formed by regular employees. Furthermore, this work typically benefits
the employer, rather than the workforce participant. The New York City
WEP has been described as follows:
WEP workers work side by side with city employees,
performing the basic tasks required in various city agen-
cies. WEP workers work with sanitation employees
98 Participants in the Wisconsin workfare program are described as follows: "For most
practical purposes, [the workfare participants] are indistinguishable from regular employees in
private employment." Brenden P. Lynch, Welfare Reform, Unemployment Compensation, and
the Social Wage: Dismantling Family Support Under Wisconsin's W-2 Workfare Plan, 33
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 593, 599 (1998).
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sweeping garbage, picking up debris, and cleaning sani-
tation trucks. Moreover, WEP workers serve as office
workers, filing documents, handling telephone inquiries,
and assisting the public; as hospital employees, cleaning
buildings, emptying bedpans, and serving meals; and as
park employees, constructing fences and barricades,
making repairs, and painting and maintaining park
grounds.99
In these situations, it would be impossible to conceive how the employer
would fail to benefit from receiving all these services. Moreover,
workfare participants often displace other workers. Estimates indicate
that, from 1993 to 1997, approximately 22,000 public sector jobs were
lost in New York City. During that same period, the city employed
38,000 WEP workers. 00 These statistics make it clear that under a total-
ity of the circumstances approach, workfare participants should properly
be classified as employees within the meaning of FLSA.
B. EXEMPTIONS
Furthermore, workfare participants should not be classified as either
volunteers or trainees. Recall that to be classified as a volunteer, one
must work "without promise or expectation of compensation, but solely
for his personal purpose or pleasure." This does not describe a workfare
situation; workfare participants are working in order to receive TANF
benefits. They are working because if they fail to work they will be
denied cash and non-cash benefits. This is work with the expectation of
compensation in the form of a government benefit. This, in no way, is
work solely for one's "personal purpose or pleasure."
Similarly, the typical workfare participant should not be classified
as a trainee.' 0 Recall the six-part test set forth by the DOL, and en-
99 Lauri Cohen, Free Labor in the Name of Workfare: New York's Reaction to the
Brukhman v. Giuliani Decision, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 711, 719-20 (1998); further, "[u]nions and
advocates for welfare recipients contending that workfare workers should be viewed as em-
ployees state that it is readily apparent that workfare participants are performing similar tasks
as unionized city workers, and that if they were not doing this work, then city employees
would have to clean the streets, collect garbage, and dispose of medical waste." Collins, supra
note 9, at 258-59.
1oo See Cohen, supra note 99, at 719-20, for evidence that WEP workers are replacing
low-wage jobs. WEP workers in New York City's WEP program are "doing exactly what the
statute prohibits." Id. at 728. See infra notes 110-11 for a discussion of other displacement
examples.
1l Cf. Collins, supra note 9. Collins argues that "[b]ecause workfare is meant to be a
temporary training program rather than a full-time career work assignment, workfare partici-
pants properly should be viewed as trainees and not as employees." Id. at 259. Collins bases
his argument on his belief that workfare workers may be less efficient than regular employees
because they may need more supervision than regular employees. Id. Additionally, Congress
designed workfare to teach "job skills such as discipline and responsibility to the participants."
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dorsed by the Court, used to determine trainee status. For one to be clas-
sified as a trainee, the training one receives must be similar to that taught
in a vocational school. Far from the training typically given in a voca-
tional school, the typical workfare assignment involves tasks needing lit-
tle training. While hopefully not typical, one woman described the work
she did in a New York City WEP program as follows:
I was forced to lift heavy, wet, urine-soaked mattresses
into the back of a garbage truck. It looked like the mat-
tresses had been dumped there a while ago, and they
smelled very badly. When I picked up the mattress[es],
the liquid from them soaked my shirt and pants, going
through to my skin.102
This is not the kind of training typical in a vocational setting, nor is it the
kind of work likely to lead to advancement. 10 3 Furthermore, if the par-
ticipant's work experience is coupled with any classroom training, it is
typically of the job placement or job readiness type. Participants are
taught how to dress, how to set their alarm clock, and how to prepare a
job resume. This is hardly the type of training common in vocational
schools.
Second, in order to be classified as a trainee, the training must be
for the benefit of the trainee; the employer should obtain no immediate
advantage from the trainee's activities. Although workfare participants
clearly gain some benefits from the typical workfare placement, that is
not the issue. In order to be termed a trainee, the benefit of the work
assignment must accrue to the trainee as opposed to the benefit of the
employer. Courts have found, for example, that only where the worker is
the primary beneficiary of the training may the worker properly be clas-
sified as a trainee. By contrast, where the primary beneficiary of the
training is the employer, the worker is classified as an employee rather
Id. Unfortunately, Collins ignores the Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division's six-
prong test designed to distinguish a trainee from an employee, except in his acknowledgment
"that the state does not truly benefit from the work performed by workfare workers due to the
greater training and supervision needed when administering a workfare program." Id. at 261.
This argument completely misrepresents the reality of the typical workfare assignment, which
is totally devoid of training, see infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text, and ignores the
real benefits conferred by the workfare participants' labor.
102 Mahmoudov, supra note 12, at 353 (quoting from a class action lawsuit brought
against the City of New York). Mahmoudav relates a story of a plaintiff who was ordered to
pick up dead animals with her bare hands. The plaintiff asserts: "The animals had been run
over by automobiles and were oozing blood and entrails. When I picked up the animals with
my bare hands to throw them into the garbage trucks, the guts splattered on my shoes and
pants. My coworker vomited." Id. at 354.
103 See Gail Aska, Is Workfare Working?, 8 J.L. & PoL'Y 107, 149 (describing New York
City's Work Experience Program as follows: "It is not a program that offers training of any
real caliber. We have people who have been put into WEP who spend an entire day changing
the rolls of toilet paper in a bathroom. I do not see that as skill-building.").
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than a trainee. 10 4 This describes the typical workfare situation. The ben-
efits of an assignment to the workfare participant are negligible; the work
is typically menial and rarely leads to advancement or to a full-time, paid
job. 10 5 The workfare assignment is perhaps best viewed as the workfare
participant "working off' her welfare payment, rather than acquiring val-
uable skills and experiences that will help her obtain a full time job.
0 6
On the other hand, the employer clearly benefits from the workfare par-
ticipant's labor. The workfare participant may perform clerical work,
janitorial work, or maintenance work along with regular employees.
Moreover, workfare participants clearly displace regular employees
in typical workfare situations. 10 7 During the time period in which New
York's WEP program has been operating, New York City has been able
to reduce its paid workforce significantly. This has been accomplished
in part through the use of increasing numbers of workfare participants.
104 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1209 (4th Cir. 1989) ("This court has
concluded that the general test used to determine if an employee is entitled to the protections
of the Act is whether the employee or the employer is the primary beneficiary of the trainees'
labor."); Marshall v. Baptist Hospital, Inc., 473 F.Supp. 465, 468 (Tenn. 1979) ("It is . . .
important in such cases to determine whether the primary benefit from the relationship flows
to the learner or to the alleged employer.").
105 Bertelli, supra note 7, 186 ("It appears that workfare has little chance of providing
work experience that will lead to unsubsidized employment."); see also Cohen, supra note 99,
at 734-35 ("Despite the hope that national welfare reform, especially workfare, would be a
panacea for many ills, it has not ever been particularly effective at taking participants off
welfare and placing them into permanent jobs .... [E]vidence suggests that only about one-
half of those leaving welfare rolls have jobs, a percentage no better than in periods of weaker
economies and less stringent welfare rules."); Mahmoudov, supra note 12, at 352 ("According
to [New York] city records, fewer than one-tenth of the 125,000 people who have passed
through the program have reported finding permanent jobs." (quoting David Firestone, Prais-
ing the Wonders of Workfare, Guiliani Finds a Campaign Theme, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1997,
at B3)); Aska, supra note 103, at 153 (finding that in a survey of 500 workfare workers, all
those questioned had "no hope that their placement was going to lead to a job").
106 Harsh criticism has been leveled against workfare programs: "These are make-work
jobs requiring recipients to work off their grants. They rarely provide useful training ....
Workfare has been utilized to sanction clients and the goal is not to develop a client's skills,
which is often promoted as its reason, but really to, reduce clients' payments or force them off
the rolls." Ruth Brandwein, Women's Reality: Making Welfare Work and Making Work Pay,
21 Soc. JUST. 71, 75 (1994); see also Quigley, supra note 50, at 639 ("The emphasis is on job
placement, not job training."). On the other hand, those who oppose attaching employee status
to workfare participants argue that workfare is "'part work, part training,' designed to prepare
welfare recipients, victimized by 'low IQ, substance abuse, [and] little discipline,' to enter the
competitive job market." Mahmoudov, supra note 12, at 361-62 (citing Paul Offner, The Mini-
mum Wage Debacle, WASH. POST, June 16, 1997, at A21). But this argument ignores the
ineffectiveness of workfare programs in placing participants in full-time employment and the
fact that participants perform the same labor as regular employees; it also misapplies the statu-
tory requirement as interpreted in prior cases. Id. at 362-63.
107 See Briskin & Thomas, supra note 3, at 575 ("[Tihere is a record of workfare workers
displacing regular workers. ); David L. Gregory, Breaking the Exploitation of Labor?:
Tensions Regarding the Welfare Workforce, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 19, 25 ("Workfare has
similarly altered the infrastructure of low wage employment by causing job displacement
among the working poor.").
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This has, it should be noted, been accomplished despite the PRWORA's
anti-displacement provision. 08 The displacement provision prohibits ac-
tually laying off or firing an employee to make room for a workfare
participant. It does, however, allow the employer to replace employees
lost through attrition with workfare participants. That is what is happen-
ing in New York City, and presumably in other states and municipalities
that employ workfare programs.
While the typical workfare participant is not entitled to a job at the
end of the placement period, this fact alone should not be sufficient to
convert what is clearly a work experience into a training experience.
Last, in order to be properly termed a trainee, both the employer and
trainee must understand that the trainee is not entitled to wages for the
time spent in training. This does not describe the typical workfare situa-
tion. While the employer might understand that he does not have to pay
the workfare participant from his general payroll, the participant is work-
ing in expectation of receiving her government benefit check. The
worker is working to receive compensation in return for that work. The
label assigned to that compensation should be irrelevant. Sums paid in
return for labor are termed wages.'0 9
C. FLSA POLICY OBJECTIVES
Finally, it is important to consider the policy objectives of the FLSA
when deciding whether or not a workfare participant is an employee.
Policy objectives are an important part of the totality of the circum-
stances approach taken by the courts. It should be recalled that the FLSA
has two major policy objectives. The first objective is to protect employ-
ees who are unable to protect themselves. Congress designed the Act to
protect those most vulnerable, those least able to protect themselves, an
objective that will clearly be served by extending FLSA coverage to wel-
fare recipients. Welfare recipients are often women with children; they
typically lack education or skills" 0 and are statutorily compelled to find
108 PRWORA's anti-displacement provision, § 607(f), provides:
No adult in a work activity[,] . . . which is funded, in whole or in part, by funds
provided by the Federal Government shall be employed or assigned-
(A) when any other individual is on layoff from the same or any substantially
equivalent job; or
(B) if the employer has terminated the employment of any regular employee or oth-
erwise caused an involuntary reduction of its workforce in order to fill the vacancy
so created with an adult [whose work activity is "funded in whole or in part with
funds provided by the Federal Government]."
109 EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 43, at 32.
t 1o For example, over half of the welfare population has less than a high-school diploma.
Donna A. Pavetti, Who is Affected by Time Limits?, in WELFARE REFORM: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE ISSUES 31, 32 (Isabel V. Sawhill ed., 1995); see also K.H. Porter, Making Jobs Work:
What the Research Says About Effective Employment Programs for AFDC Recipients, Center
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work to continue to receive government benefits. They are obviously a
group without the power to negotiate a living wage.
Extending FLSA coverage to workfare participants serves the sec-
ond objective equally well. The second objective of FLSA relates to
preserving competition, both with respect to the employer's competitors
and labor competition. In other words, the FLSA is meant to prevent an
employer from gaining an unfair advantage over his competitors by low-
ering labor costs through paying sub-minimum wage. Whether or not
this occurs in the workfare situation depends on the placement specifics.
Although this seems to be an unlikely concern in the typical public sec-
tor, public works placement, not all workfare placements are in the pub-
lic sector. Some placements for example, are with non- or not-for-profit
organizations which fund their charitable operations by selling goods or
services in the marketplace. Here, the availability of sub-minimum wage
labor might give these employers a competitive advantage in the market-
place. Moreover, the second objective also pertains to the market for
low-wage labor. The FLSA recognizes the effect of allowing certain em-
ployees to sell their labor below minimum-wage levels on the market for
low-wage labor. In this case, it is clear that paying workfare participants
below minimum wage will have a deleterious effect on the low-wage
labor market."' Placement of workfare participants in New York's
WEP program has been estimated to cause a decrease of $1.03 per hour
in the existing wages of workers. 12 Moreover, the fact that displace-
ment has already occurred provides some evidence that this program will
have such a negative effect.
Thus, it is my assertion that workfare participants should be consid-
ered employees within the meaning of the FLSA. Given the totality of
on Budget and Policy Priorities, Washington, D.C., 1990; Mildred Rein, Work in Welfare:
Past Failures and Future Strategies, 56 Soc. SERV. REV. 211, 219 (1982). Over half of teen-
age mother welfare recipients receive such low scores on tests of basic skills that they do not
even qualify to enter many training programs. J. Lawrence Aber et al., Effects of Welfare
Reform on Teenage Parents and Their Children, in THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 53, 58 (1995).
Of those that graduate high school, only 7.6% read at a national average level. Loic J. D.
Wacquant & William Julius Wilson, Poverty, Joblessness, and the Social Transformation of
the Inner City, in WELFARE POLICY FOR THE 1990s 70 (P. Cottingham & D.T. Ellwood eds.,
1989). See Gregory, supra note 107, at 20 (citing a study by Employment Policies Institute
that estimated 38% of welfare recipients as functionally illiterate). This creates a substantial
mismatch between the relatively high skills required for many jobs and the low skill level of
many welfare recipients and this disparity is likely to increase rather than decrease. See Sue E.
Berryman, The Economy, Literacy Requirements, and At-Risk Adults, in LITERACY AND THE
MARKETPLACE: IMPROVING THE LITERACY OF Low-INCOME MOTHERS 22 (The Rockefeller
Foundation, June 1989).
11 Cohen, supra note 99, at 731 ("A study of the impact of adding WEP workers to the
workforce, based on an elasticity of demand analysis, shows that the effect is displacement of
workers, depression of wages for the workers that remain, or a combination of both.").
1 12 Quigley, supra note 50, at 649-50 (citing Lawrence Mischel and John Schmitt, Cut-
ting Wages by Cutting Welfare, BRIEFING PAPER (Oct. 3, 1995)).
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the circumstances, the typical workfare assignment represents an em-
ployment relationship, one where the workfare participant is working in
exchange for government benefits. Moreover, the policy objectives of
FLSA are best served by characterizing the workfare participant as an
employee.
D. JOHNS V. STEWART: HOW DID THE COURT ERR?
The only federal case, Johns v. Stewart," 3 to consider directly the
question of whether workfare participants are employees under FLSA
found that they were not covered employees. In that case, the plaintiffs,
recipients under Utah's General Assistance (GA), were required to par-
ticipate in 96 hours per month of community work, adult education or
skills training activities through Utah's Work Experience and Training
Program (WEAT). In return, they were provided with $233 per month,
GA benefits, and $45 per month WEAT work allowance. The plaintiff,
Johns, was assigned to perform maintenance and painting duties at a lo-
cal corporation. 1 4 The Court refused to apply the four-factor Bonnette
test, declaring that the test applied only in the independent contractor-
employee situation.115 Instead, the court looked to the totality of the
circumstances. " 16
The Johns court relied heavily on Marshall v. Regis Educational
Corp., 117 in which the court held that college resident hall assistants were
not employees, calling RA assignment "only one circumstance in the
whole activity of the college program." 118 Similarly, the Johns court
concluded that focusing narrowly on the work component of the GA-
WEAT program "fail[ed] to take into consideration the circumstances of
the whole activity."' 19 Just as the Marshall court found the work assign-
ment to be one part of a larger whole education, the Johns court found
the work assignment to be but one part of a larger whole, assistance.
Additionally, the Johns court held that workfare employees differed sub-
stantially from other state employees. 20 First, workfare "participants ap-
ply for public assistance, not for a state job."' 21 Second, workfare
participants "differ from state employees in that they do not receive the
113 Jons v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544, 1544-45 (10th Cir. 19995).
114 Id. at 1551.
115 Id. at 1559 n. 21.
116 Id.
117 666 F.2d at 1328.
118 Id.
119 Johns, 57 F.3d at 1558.
120 Id. at 1558-59.
121 Id. at 1558.
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same salary, safe working conditions, [and other benefits] as do the ac-
tual employees."
122
Commentators have unanimously criticized the Johns case, 12 3 as-
serting that the court ignored the economic realities test set forth by the
Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc. 124 and
failed to apply the totality of the circumstances approach from Tony &
Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor correctly. 125 In addition,
the court has been criticized for not considering holdings in analogous
situations, such as cases in which prison workers were found to consti-
tute employees entitled to FLSA protection,1 26 homeless individuals par-
ticipating in a work program were found to be covered employees,127 and
former mental patients performing work at a hotel were found to be em-
ployees. 128 These courts focused on such factors as whether the work
duties actually performed were similar to those of regular employees and
whether the workers expected any profit. Had the Johns court asked
these questions, the result would likely have been different. Interest-
ingly, the Johns court actually admitted that workfare participants "may
perform the same functions as regular employees at some of the projects
to which they are assigned,"' 129 but failed to give this fact the weight that
it deserved.
Moreover, the Johns court's reliance on the different treatment af-
forded to state employees and workforce participants is misplaced.
"Such an argument is tantamount to blaming the victim. All of these
differences should be reasons for according protections to workfare
workers, not for denying them."130 Moreover, the court's analysis makes
the employer's classification and treatment determinative of coverage.
That analysis leads to the nonsensical result that, because the employer
treats a worker badly and refuses to afford her statutory protections, she
is denied the protection of the statute. 131 The Supreme Court has made it
122 Id. at 1559 (quoting Klaips v. Bergland, 715 F.2d 477, 483 (10th Cir. 1983)).
123 See Briskin & Thomas, supra note 3; Mahmoudov, supra note 12, at 572-73; Miller,
supra note 15, at 365-68; Reese, supra note 5, at 892-94.
124 366 U.S. 28, 32-33 (1961).
125 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
126 Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1549 (5th Cir. 1990).
127 Archie v. Grand Cont. P'ship, 997 F.Supp 504, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
128 Donovan v. New Floridian Hotel, 676 F.2d 468, 468 (Fla. 1982).
129 Johns, 57 F.3d at 1559.
130 Briskin & Thomas, supra note 3, at 572.
131 Ms. Reese points out that the "Johns test, which focuses on how the employer treats
the worker and what benefits the worker receives, leads to an absurd result. Under the Johns
test, workers would neither be considered employees nor receive minimum wage under the
FLSA because the employer treats them poorly and gives them little pay and benefits." Reese,
supra note 5, at 893.
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clear that employer classification is irrelevant to, not determinative of,
employee status. 1
32
Finally, the court failed to take into account the public policy objec-
tives of the FLSA and the fact that these objectives could only be served
by finding employee status for Johns. This analysis should have consid-
ered both objectives of the FLSA, the desire to protect the most vulnera-
ble, and the desire to protect competition. The court should have
considered the extent to which workfare employees had displaced regular
employees, among other factors.
CONCLUSION: PUBLIC POLICY GOALS
Both the FLSA and PRWORA are designed to achieve certain well
defined public policy objectives. Congress adopted the FLSA to relieve
the effects of the Depression, by protecting the most vulnerable, those
unable to negotiate on their own behalf for a living wage, and by preserv-
ing competition.' 33 PRWORA, enacted nearly sixty years later, again
focuses on the most vulnerable, women and children receiving welfare.
PRWORA treats work as the solution to a host of perceived problems
with the delivery of welfare. It was designed to end dependence on wel-
fare by promoting work. Work can only lead to independence, however,
if that work provides either a wage sufficient to live on or skills and
experience that will lead to such future work. It is therefore clear that the
public policy objectives of both PRWORA and FLSA can best be
achieved by affording workfare participants a minimum wage. 134
Congress is currently considering reauthorization of TANF. On
May 16, 2002 the House passed House Bill 4737: The Personal Respon-
sibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act of 2002. The Senate also con-
sidered a number of proposed bills, specifically the Tri-Partisan
132 Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 (1985).
133 See Goldstein et al., supra note 54, at 988 (discussing lack of employment protections
for farm workers: "some of America's hardest working, lowest paid laborers-those most in
need of minimum-wage protection-are frequently left with legal recourse only against itiner-
ant, judgment-proof labor contractors when they are not paid the $5.15 per hour to which they
are entitled").
134 See generally STEVE SAVNER, CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, THE IMPLICA-
TIONS OF APPLYING FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGE STANDARDS TO TANF WORK ACTIVITIES 10
(1997), available at http://ml508O.kaivo.com/LegalDev/CLASP/DMS/Documents/10365300
76.68/fdolresp.pdf ("To the extent that one effect of FLSA coverage is to increase states' focus
on helping recipients secure unsubsidized employment as opposed to participation in work
experience programs, such emphasis is appropriate and consistent with the desire of most
recipients to secure unsubsidized jobs as opposed to working in exchange for welfare assis-
tance."). It should be noted that even if one is employed full time at minimum wage, she earns
approximately $10,300 per year, which is significantly below the poverty level for a family of
three, which was $14,269 in 2001. BERNADETTE PROCTER & JOSEPH DALAKER, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, POVERTY IN THE UNITED: 2001 11, at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p60-
219.pdf.
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Consensus Provisions which were approved by the Senate Finance Com-
mittee on June 26, 2002. Neither bill was passed in 2002; instead, TANF
was extended and discussion of welfare reform postponed. TANF
reauthorization is again be on the public policy agenda in 2003. Al-
though the House and Senate Bills differ significantly, they have impor-
tant similarities. Most importantly, both bills would substantially
increase the number of families required to participate in welfare-to-
work programs. First, both bills would require state participation rates to
rise from 50% in 2002 to 70% by 2007.135 In addition, the current
TANF law includes a "caseload reduction credit," under which a state's
required participation rate can be reduced by 1 percentage point for each
percentage point reduction in the state's TANF assistance caseload since
1995. Because welfare caseloads have declined so drastically since
1995,136 the caseload reduction credit has lowered required work partici-
pation rates to less than 10 percent in 42 states.137 The Senate bill would
eliminate the caseload reduction credit entirely, and implement "employ-
ment credit" instead, which would reduce the required participation rates
for families placed in jobs.'138 The Senate bill would, however, cap this
employment credit at 20 percentage points. The House bill, in compari-
son, does not replace the caseload reduction credit with an employment
credit. Under the House bill's caseload reduction credit, states would be
able to reduce their participation requirements if their TANF caseloads
fell during the previous three years.
Second, the House bill would increase the number of hours that a
participant would have to be involved in a work activity weekly to fulfill
the state's participation requirement. Under the House bill, recipients
would have to participate for 40 hours each week to qualify as being
engaged in a work activity.139 Participants are required to spend twenty-
four of these hours participating in a rather narrow set of direct work
135 H.R. 4737 § 110, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002); see generally FREMSTAD & PARROTT,
supra note 10; SHARON PARROTT ET AL., CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, KEY
ISSUES IN THE HOUSE TANF REAUTHORIZATION BILL (2002), at http://www.cbpp.org/5-8-02
tanf.htm [hereinafter TANF ISSUES].
136 Since implementation of PRWORA, "welfare caseloads have dropped dramatically,
from 5.5% of the total U.S. population in 1994 to 2.1% in June 2000." HEATHER BOUSHEY &
BETHNEY GUNDERSEN, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, WHEN WORK JUST ISN'T ENOUGH MEA-
SURING HARDSHIPS FACED BY FAMILIES AFTER MOVING FROM WELFARE TO WORK 1 (2000).
This represents more than 50% decline in welfare recipients nationwide. Richard Kazis, Op-
portunity and Advancement for Low-Wage Workers, Low-WAGE WORKERS IN THE NEW ECON-
OMY 1, 1 (Richard Kazis & Marc S. Miller eds., 2001). Some states report declines of 70% or
more since 1995. DEMETRA SMITH NIGHTINGALE ET AL., THE URBAN INSTITUTE, THE STATUS
OF THE WELFARE-To-WORK (WtW) GRANTS PROGRAM AFTER ONE YEAR 1 (1999), at WWW.
urban.org/urlprint.cfm?ID=6598.
137 FREMSTAD & PARROT, supra note 10, at 5.
138 Id.
139 TANF ISSUES, supra 135, at 6.
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activities, including paid and unpaid work. 140 Under the Senate bill, the
number of hours required weekly remains at 30, but the number of hours
spent in priority activities rises from 20 to 24.141 Commentators predict
that, by limiting the number of work activities that would count toward
increased state work participation requirements, the proposed
reauthorization bills-especially the House bill-would effectively com-
pel all states to operate large workfare programs.142 If this prediction is
true, increasing numbers of TANF recipients will be likely to participate
in workfare programs; it thus becomes essential that Congress extend the
protections of employment protection legislation, including FLSA, to all
participants.
Neither bill, as proposed, addresses the employee status of workfare
participants. If Congress insists on increasing the participation require-
ments and the hours that welfare recipients must work, it should explic-
itly extend the protection of employment legislation, including FLSA, to
workfare participants. Prior law extended these protections to workfare
participants and should be included in the TANF reauthorization bills.
Although the position of this article is that, in most workfare situations, a
well-reasoned application of the totality of circumstances test would re-
sult in a finding of employee status and FLSA coverage, that requires
litigation and determination on a case-by-case basis. It is unreasonable
to ask the most vulnerable to be strong and assertive in demanding their
rights; it is unreasonable to demand the poorest of our citizens to litigate
to achieve those rights. Therefore, it makes sense from a public policy,
as well as from an equitable, perspective to explicitly afford workfare
participants employee status under FLSA and the resulting employment
protections, such as minimum wage.
140 Id. Paid work would include unsubsidized and subsidized employment and on-the-job
training; unpaid work would include workfare. Id.
141 FREMSTAD & PARROTT, supra note 10, at 7.
142 Id. at 1. The minority view against the passage of H.R. 4090 was concerned with the
fact that "more than half of the States could not fulfill the bill's work requirement without
violating the current minimum wage protection (in the case of a two-person family)." H.R.
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 107TH CONG., PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY, WORK, AND FAMILY
PROMOTION ACT OF 2002, H. REP. 107-460, at 150 (2002). House Member Maxine Waters
stated that "[w]orkfare is a program where people are herded like cattle into unskilled labor,
where they are paid low wages and not given protections that non-welfare recipients have,
such as minimum wage, OSHA protections, and civil rights regulations." 148 CONG. REC.
E638 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 2002) (statement of Rep. Waters). See generally HEIDI GOLDBERG,
CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, RECENT TANF PROPOSALS WOULD HINDER SUC-
CESSFUL STATE EFFORTS TO HELP FAMILIES OVERCOME BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT AND FIND
BETTER PAYING JOBS (2002), at http://www.cbpp.org/5-9-02tanf.pdf (arguing that proposed
legislation would decrease state flexibility and force states to replace current strategies with
subsidized jobs or workfare program).
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